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NOTES AND COMMENTS
selling expenses to a minimum. To the newcomer in the field, such
contracts offer the possibility of a predictable market on the basis of
which he may estimate what capital expenditures are necessary. Still
more important to the newcomer is the opportunity these contracts may
provide to establish a foothold against the counter-attacks of entrenched
competitors. However, requirements contracts deny retailers the oppor-
tunity to deal in the products of competing suppliers. Since these sup-
pliers are excluded from access to the outlets subject to such contracts,
the new supplier may find himself foreclosed from any substantial market.
Whatever the commercial merits and demerits of the contract in-
volved, the North Carolina statute in making requirements contracts
illegal, per se, precludes any rule of reason which might otherwise be
applied. The statute leaves no room for evidence as to a defendant's
competitive position in the industry nor for testimony as to commercial
justification of the contract in the particular case. While such a situation
may seem undesirable, it must be remembered that the test of reason-
ableness places a tremendous burden on the courts to interpret com-
plicated economic data-an undertaking for which courts are not
particularly well suited.17
If all lease-sublease arrangements are held within the purview of
the statute, suppliers might turn to the use of ordinary long-term con-
tracts in which the purchaser agrees to buy a denominated amount of
goods rather than his specific requirements.' 8 Or, the supplier might
simply refuse to deal with any retailer who has not shown a willingness
to deal exclusively in the supplier's product.
On the other hand, there is a strong possibility that in so far as
oil companies are concerned, prohibition of the lease-sublease arrange-
ment would force them to resort to agency arrangements or to the out-
right acquisition of filling stations, either of which means increasing
control over the retail field and forcing the independent owner to ex-
change his status for that of employee. Regardless of the possible con-
sequences, this most recent decision on the point by the North Carolina
court indicates that such lease-sublease contracts will be held illegal.
JOsEPH F. BOWEN, JR.
Taxation-Alimony Payments-State and Federal Income
Tax Consequences
No attorney can properly settle a separation or divorce case involv-
ing alimony or payments under a separation agreement, without con-
17 See Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U. S. 293, 310 (1949).
s Some courts find this method less objectionable than requirements contracts.
Ibid.
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sidering the income tax consequences. This necessarily entails close
scrutiny of both state and federal statutes.
The North Carolina income tax statutes provide that effective Jan-
uary 1, 1949, payments for the separate support and maintenance of a
divorced or estranged spouse, who is living apart from the spouse mak-
ing such payments, will be an allowable deduction. The payment may
be made pursuant to a court order or under terms of a written or oral
agreement of the parties. The deduction is limited, however, to the
amount of the payment or one thousand dollars, whichever is smaller.
Where payments are made to more than one spouse, then a similar
limited deduction may be taken for each spouse. Support payments to
a dependent or to a spouse for a dependent cannot be included in this
deduction.1 It appears that alimony or separation payments received
are not taxable as income.2  Since the state statute is applicable to all
types of alimony payments, problems seldom arise in this area.
The Revenue Act of 1942 completely revised the federal tax treat-
ment of alimony.3 This changed the earlier rule under Gould v. Gotld4
that alimony was not taxable income to the wife nor deductible by the
husband. An examination of the legislative history of the alimony sec-
tions reveals that Congress hoped to achieve a uniform treatment of
amounts paid in the nature of or in lieu of alimony regardless of vari-
ance in the laws of the several states.5
With one exception, Section 23(u) of the Internal Revenue Code
provides if a payment is includible in the income of the wife under
Section 23(k) it is deductible from adjusted gross income of the hus-
band.6 Also where the husband is allowed a deduction, a fortiori, it is
taxable income to the wife. However, in order for the payments to be
deductible by the husband and taxable as income to the wife, they must
meet the conditions of Section 22(k) and 23(u) of the Code. These
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-147(14) (Supp. 1949); P-H N. C. INc. TAX SERV.
110,750 (1950).2 P-H N. C. INc. TAX SERv. 110,485 (1950). Administrative boards have
recommended to the present legislature that alimony payments be returned for tax-
ation in the same amount as they are allowed for deductions.
2 See generally, Kramer, Alimony and the Tax Law, 26 TAXES 1105 (1948)
Starr, Alimony as an Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAXES 975 (1949); Wall, Ali-
mony and the Income Tax, 3 MIAMI L. REv. 564 (1949); 34 MINN. L. REv. 280(1950).
'245 U. S. 151 (1917).
'H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942); SEN. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1943); Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 37 S. E. 2d
118 (1946) ("Alimony ... is an allowance made for the support of the wife out
of the estate of the husband by order of court in an appropriate proceeding and
is either temporary or permanent.") ; KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. §560 (3rd
ed. 1946) (It is that obligation for support which arises in favor of the wife
upon the disruption of the marriage relation.).




statutory conditions will be examined in the light of the law of alimony
in North Carolina.
(1) The parties must be divorced or legally separated under a decree
of divorce or of separate maintenance.7 If the wife applies for divorce
from bed and board, divorce a vinculo, or alimony without divorce,
alimony pendente lite is provided for by statute in North Carolina.8
Alimony payments pendente lite, however, are not deductible by the
husband nor taxable to the wife because ordered prior to rather than
pursuant to a decree by the court.9
An alimony without divorce decree, as provided for in North Caro-
lina, seems to be neither a decree of legal separation nor a decree of
divorce ;1o therefore, payments made pursuant to a decree of alimony
without divorce are not deductible under Section 23(u) nor taxable
under Section 22(k).11
Since in North Carolina a divorce a vinculo cannot provide for
permanent alimony, ordinarily no tax problem arises.12 If, however, a
decree of absolute divorce is obtained upon the grounds of two years
separation, as provided for in N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-5 or §50-6, such
decree does not destroy the right of the wife to receive alimony under
7 IxT. REv. CODE §22(k) : "In the case of a wife who is divorced or legally
separated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance-
periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received subsequent
to such decree in discharge of, or attributable to property transferred (in trust
or otherwise) in discharge of, a legal obligation which, because of the marital
or family relationship, is imposed upon or incurred by such husband under such
decree or under a written separation instrument incident to such divorce or separa-
tion shall be includible in the gross income of such wife, and such amounts re-
ceived as are attributable to property so transferred shall not be includible in the
gross income of such husband. . .. " INT. REv. CODE §23 (u) provides for a
deduction "In the case of a husband described in section 22(k), amounts includible
under section 22(k), in the gross income of his wife, payment of which is made
within the husband's taxable year. If the amount of any such payment is, under
section 22(k) or section 171, stated to be not includible in such husband's gross
income, no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such payment under this
subsection."
8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-15 (1943) (a zinculo and a inensa actions); N. C.
GEN. STAT. §50-16 (1943) (alimony without divorce actions) ; Peele v. Peele, 216
N. C. 298, 4 S. E. 2d 616 (1939); Medlin v. Medlin, 175 N. C. 529, 95 S. E.
857 (1918) (a vincudo action by husband, court allowed alimony pendente lite to
wife).
IGeorge D. Wick, 7 T. C. 723 (1946),.aff'd, 161 F. 2d 732 (3rd Cir. 1947).
The Pennsylvania statute providing for alimony pendente lite, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23 §46 (1930) as amended (1933), is very similar to N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-15
(1943). See U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(k)-l(a) (1948).
10 N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-16 (1943) provides for a decree if the husband deserts
and fails to provide, or is a drunkard or spendthrift (which would not seem to
call necessarily for separate living), or gives cause for divorce, absolute or lim-
ited). See, Shore v. Shore, 220 N. C. 802, 804, 18 S. E. 2d 353, 354 (1942) (the
statute is one solely for support).
"' Frank J. Kalchthaler, 7 T. C. 625 (1946) (status under Pennsylvania law
was that he was living apart from his wife, but not legally separated).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-11 (1943), Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 37 S. E.
118 (1946).
19511
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
any judgment or decree of the court rendered before the commencement
of the proceeding for absolute divorce 13 This exception seems to in-
clude awards under an a mensa divorce, 14 alimony without divorce
awards, 15 and separation agreements,'0 entered into prior to the divorce
a vincido. As noted above, alimony without divorce awards are not
considered taxable under Section 22(k) because the parties have neither
a legal separation nor a divorce. 17 On the other hand, if a prior ali-
mony without divorce decree is incorporated into, or is referred to in
the a vinculo divorce decree, it would seem to meet the requirement that
the provision for payment be made in the divorce decree or by a written
instrument incident to the divorce or separation. Further, separation
agreements entered into prior to a decree of absolute divorce are not
invalidated by a divorce a Vinculo.' 8  Thus, if the separation agreement
is prepared with the understanding that the parties will be legally
separated under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, then
the payments received after the divorce a vinculo are taxable to the
wife.19
On divorce from bed and board in North Carolina, the court may
decree alimony to the wife.20 Alimony paid pursuant to a decree of
divorce from bed and board is deductible by the husband,2' and such
decree may be modified at a later date. 22 But if an agreement is entered
into after the divorce, increasing the payments, the increase will not be
deductible unless the new agreement is incorporated into the decree.23
The agreement would not be "incident to the divorce" unless so incor-
porated. The same grounds which entitle the wife to a divorce a 1nensa
entitle the wife to separate maintenance. 24 Therefore, it may be to her
financial advantage to refuse to obtain a divorce a mnensa, payments
13 N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-11 (1943), Simmons v. Simmons, 223 N. C. 841,
28 S. E. 2d 489 (1944) (alimony without divorce) ; Dyer v. Dyer, 212 N. C. 620,
194 S. E. 278 (1937) (action for subsistence).
"
4See, Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 134, 37 S. E. 2d 118, 121 (1946) (a
prior award of alimony is protected from annulment by a decree in absolute
divorce).
" Simmons v. Simmons, 223 N. C. 841, 28 S. E. 2d 439 (1944).1 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 225 N. C. 681, 36 S. E. 2d 233 (1945); Lentz v. Lentz,
193 N. C. 742, 138 S. E. 12 (1927) (consent judgment not affected by a subse-
quent absolute divorce).
"* See note 11, stepra.
"
8Jenkins v. Jenkins, 225 N. C. 681, 36 S. E. 2d 233 (1945) ; Lentz v. Lentz,
193 N. C. 742, 138 S. E. 12 (1927).
" Tuckee G. Hesse, 7 T. C. 700 (1946) (Pennsylvania divorce a vinculo
statute involved, and similar to N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-11 (1943)).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-14 (1943), Silver v. Silver, 220 N. C. 191, 16 S. E. 2d
834 (1941).
"Accord, George D. Wick, 7 T. C. 723, 728 (1946), aff'd, 161 F. 2d 732(3d Cir. 1947).
" Crews v. Crews, 175 N. C. 168, 95 S. E. 149 (1918).
"Natalia Danesi Murray, P-H 1948 TC MEm. DEC. 48,097 (1948).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-16 (1943).
[Vol. 29
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under it being taxable, and receive tax free alimony under a separate
maintenance award.
(2) The provision for payment of alimony must be made specific-
ally by the divorce decree or by a written instrument incident to the
divorce or separation 5 When the provision for payment is expressly
set out in the decree of divorce, there is no problem. Most of the
cases under this section involve the problem of whether the separation
agreement is incident to the divorce or separation. If a separation agree-
ment meets certain requirements, it will be enforced' in North Caro-
lina .2  Unless the separation agreement is entered into with a future
divorce or legal separation in mind, however, payments received after
the divorce are not taxable to the wife under Section 22(k) as not
incident to the divorce.27  A formal agreement of separation providing
for payments, drafted after a decree of divorce a vinculo or a mensa,
reducing to writing an oral agreement entered into prior to the decree,
is not an agreement incident to the divorce. 28  If the agreement refers
to an impending divorce, it might be construed as facilitating the divorce
and will not be enforced. 29  Recognizing this, the Tax Court has held
that to be incident to the divorce or legal separation, the agreement
itself does not have to refer to the divorce or separation because the
whole record will be considered30 Even payments made by taxpayer-
" INT. REv. CODE §22(k) ; Charles Campbell, 15 T. C. (No. 52) (1950) (letter
written by husband stating he would pay a certain amount monthly to his wife
if she obtained a divorce met the requirement of a written instrument).
"Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N. C. 408, 74 S. E. 327 (1912) (requisites of
separation agreement: (1) there must be a separation already existing or imme-
diately to follow the execution of the deed; (2) the separation deed must be
made for an adequate reason, of such kind that it is necessary for the health or
happiness of one or the other; (3) it must be reasonable and fair to the wife,
considering the condition of the parties) ; N. C. GEN. STAr. §52-12 (Supp. 1947)
(statutory requirements of valid agreement).
" Charles G. Brown, P-H 1949 TC MEm. DEc. 149,195 (1949) (agreement
in form of support of wife and children under Pennsylvania law rather than for
alimony) ; Benjamin B. Cox, 10 T. C. 955 (1948), aff'd, 176 F. 2d 226 (3rd Cir.
1949) (support agreement seven months after divorce not incident to divorce);
Frederick S. Dauwalter, 9 T. C. 580 (1947) (after divorce decree entered, agreed
with wife to increase alimony; held not deductible because husband's compliance
with the request was gratuitous and without compulsion of any legal obligation
arising out of a marital relationship imposed on him under a written instrument
incident to such divorce).
"'Frederick S. Dauwalter, 9 T. C. 580 (1947); U. S. Treas. Reg. 111
§29.22(k)-i (1948) (Example (3): H and W enter into antenuptial agreement
in which H agrees to pay wife $200 a month for life for release of all dower
rights. A divorce is later obtained, but silent as to such agreement and I's
obligation to support W. Section 22(k) does not apply. But if the decree is
modified to refer to the agreement, or if at time of the divorce, reference had
been made to the agreement in the court's decree or in a written instrument inci-
dent to the divorce, Section 22(k) would require the inclusion in the income of
the wife).
" Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N. C. 408, 74 S. E. 327 (1912).
o Estate of Daniel G. Reid, 15 T. C. (No. 78) (1950) ; Robert Wood John-
son, 10 T. C. 647 (1948).
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husband -to his estranged wife under orders of a New York court, in
an attempt to enforce a voluntary separation agreement, were disallowed
as a deduction because there was no "decree" as required by Section
22(k).3 1
(3) The alimony payments must be periodic.3 2 Periodic payments
normally state the amount to be paid each period, but neither the total
period nor the total amount; whereas lump sum payments generally set
forth the total amount that is to be paid. In general, installment pay-
ments discharging a part of an obligation, the principal sum of which
is specified in the decree of divorce or legal separation or an instru-
ment incident thereto, are not considered periodic payments and are
therefore not includible in the wife's gross income under Section 22(k).
Installment payments under a lump sum award or agreement may be
deductible if the lump sum, by the terms of the decree or written instru-
ment thereto, may be or is to be paid within a period ending more than
ten years from the date of the decree or instrument. In such cases, the
installment payment is considered periodic payment but only to the
extent that such installment payments received during the wife's tax-
able year do not exceed ten percent of the principal sum.3 3  The ten
year period commences with the date the legal obligation to make
the payments in question was imposed on the husband for the first
time.34 If the payments are contingent on earnings, the payments are
considered periodic even though to be paid for a specific number of
months.3 5
(4) The payments must be made solely in settlement of the legal
obligation imposed on the husband because of the marital relationship.
In Frank J. Dubane v. Comm'r.,36 the parties orally agreed for alimony
payments of twenty dollars a week, but the subsequent written agree-
ment was so phrased that it indicated that the twenty dollar payments
were for property that the wife had previously transferred to the hus-
band. The written agreement controlled, and the payments under it
were held not to be made solely in discharge of alimony and conse-
quently non-deductible.
"Alfred Terrell, P-H 1948 TC MEm. DEC. 48,169 (1948), aff'd, 179 F. 2d
838 (7th Cir. 1950).
"Frank R. Casey, 12 T. C. 224 (1949) (payments in sum of $100 per month
for fifty months not periodic) ; J. B. Steinel, 10 T. C. 409 (1948) (sum of $100
per month until the sum of $9,500 is paid not periodic) ; INT. REV. CODE §22(k)
(though required to be periodic, the payments need not be regular).
U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29-22(k)-i (c) (1948).
Tillie Blum, 10 T. C. 1131 (1948).
"Roland Keith Young, 10 T. C. 724 (1948) (fixed period of 50 months, but
amount contingent on earnings held periodic.)
36 10 T. C. 992, 995 (1948) ("The result might be different had Congress chosen
to recognize oral agreements or had the petitioner put his oral agreement in writ-
ing in a forthright manner.").
[Vol. 29
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Many awards of alimony contain provisions for support of minor
children. If a portion of a periodic payment is specifically designated
for support of minor children, such portion is neither deductible by the
husband nor taxable to the wife.8 7 If the decree or separation agree-
ment fails to earmark part of the periodic payment as support of the
minor children, the total amount will be taxed to the wife irrespective
of how the money was expended.3 The whole decree or agreement will
be examined to see if it furnishes by implication a basis for determining
whether a portion is for the childrens' support.39 If any periodic pay-
ment is less than the amount provided in a decree or written instrument
which specified an amount for minor children's support, Section 22(k)
provides that the amount paid will be considered first as a payment for
support of the minor children and only the remainder is to be included
as income of the wife.4 0
When a legal obligation to support a divorced or estranged spouse,
living separate from his or her spouse, is satisfied by the transfer of
property or payment of a lump sum, under the North Carolina law, the
amount of such lump sum payment or the market value of the property
at the time of conveyance, or one thousand dollars, whichever is smaller,
may be taken as a deduction.41  Under federal provisions, the rental
value of real estate transferred in lieu of alimony is not deductible by
the husband because it was never included in the husband's gross
income.
42
Section 22(k) provides that periodic payments received by the wife
are includible in her income in the year received, regardless of what
system of accounting she normally uses.4 3 For the corresponding deduc-
tion, the husband is treated as if he makes his income tax return on the
cash receipt and disbursement basis. 44 Under North Carolina statutes,45
any individual who reports his income on an accrual basis may claim the
"¢U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.22(k)-l(d) (1948).
"Dora H. Moitoret, 7 T. C. 640 (1946).
"Warren Leslie, Jr., 10 T. C. 807 (1948).
40U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.22(k)-l (d) (1948). For example, if the husband
is required by terms of the decree to pay $200 a month to his divorced wife, $100
of which is designated by the decree to be for the support of their minor children,
and the husband pays only $150 to his wife, $100 is nevertheless considered to be
a payment by the husband for the support of the children.
4"N. C. Gmq. STAT. §105-147(14) (Supp. 1949); N. C. GEx. STAT. §50-17
(1943) (provision for writ of possession in all cases where the court grants
alimony by the assignment of real estate).
"Pappenheimer v. Allen, 71 F. Supp. 788 (M. D. Ga. 1947); aff'd, 164 F.
2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947) (By agreement wife lived in home of husband, under
prescribed conditions, as part of the alimony settlement. The court indicated that
rental value of the house was not taxable to the wife, because such a payment
would not be considered periodic as required by Section 22(k).).
"U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.22(k)-i(a) (1948).
"U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.23(u)-1 (1948).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-147(14) (Supp. 1949).
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deduction for alimony if the payments claimed as a deduction are actually
made within seventy-five days of the close of the taxpayer's fiscal or
calendar year, whichever is used. A deduction claimed by a cash basis
taxpayer for the transfer of property or lump sum payment must be
taken in the income year in which the transfer of property or lump sum
payment is effected. No deduction may later be claimed if not taken
in that year. But if the taxpayer uses the accrual basis for reporting
income the deduction for lump sum payments or transfer of property
may be claimed on the accrual basis and no subsequent deduction shall
be allowed.
HUNTER DALTON HEGGiE.
Taxation-Income-Gain from Sale of Land with
Growing Crops
Cases involving taxation of gain from the sale of land upon which
there are growing crops are recent and in conflict. It seems odd that
the tax consequences of such a sale have not been previously settled with
finality. The basic facts are simple. Taxpayer is a farmer engaged in
growing crops for sale at maturity. He sells land which he has owned
for more than six months upon which there is an immature crop. Tax-
payer reports his gain as a capital one within §117(j) of the Internal
Revenue Code.1
Section 117(j) is a relief provision which allows gain from the sale
of certain business property, not otherwise considered as a capital asset,
to be taxed as a capital gain. To come within this section, the taxpayer
must establish that the property sold was (1) used in his trade or
business; (2) real estate or property subject to an allowance for de-
preciation; (3) held for more than six months; (4) not property
includible in inventory; and (5) not held primarily for sale to custom-
ers in the ordinary course of trade or business.
The Bureau ruled in 19462 that upon the sale of a citrus grove hav-
ing immature fruit on the trees, a portion of the sale price must be
allocated to the growing fruit and the gain therefrom taxed as ordinary
income. The balance, attributable to the land and trees, was ruled to
be a capital gain within §117(j). A majority of the Tax Court has
followed this ruling, holding that upon the sale of either an orange
grove3 or land containing an immature wheat crop,4 an allocation must
be made on the basis of the fair market value of the growing crop at
I See Hill, Ordinary Income or Capital Gain on the Sale of an Orange Grove,
4 MIAmi L. Q. 145 (1950), written prior to the cases commented upon here.
2 1. T. 3815, 1946-2 Cum. BU.L. 30.
3 Earnest A. Watson, 15 T. C. 104 (1950).
'Thomas J. McCoy, 15 T. C. 106 (1950).
[Vol. 2
